# Download Belief and Probability by Jaakko Hintikka, Robert S. Cohen, Donald Davidson (auth.), PDF

By Jaakko Hintikka, Robert S. Cohen, Donald Davidson (auth.), John M. Vickers (eds.)

1. A notice approximately PRESUPPOSITIONS This publication is addressed to philosophers, and never inevitably to these philosophers whose pursuits and competence are principally mathematical or logical within the formal experience. It offers for the main half with difficulties within the conception of partial judgment. those difficulties are obviously formulated in numerical and logical phrases, and it is usually difficult to formulate them accurately differently. certainly, the involvement of arithmetical and logical strategies turns out necessary to the philosophies of brain and motion at simply the purpose the place they turn into interested in partial judgment and" trust. i've got attempted all through to exploit no arithmetic that's not rather hassle-free, for the main half not more than traditional mathematics and algebra. there's a few rudimentary and philosophically very important employment of limits, yet no need is made up of integrals or differentials. Mathematical induction isn't and inessentially hired within the textual content, yet is extra widespread and demanding within the apP'endix on set idea and Boolean algebra. • so far as common sense is worried, the booklet assumes a good acquaintance with predicate good judgment and its ideas. The thoughts of compactness and maximal consistency prove to have very important employment, which i've got attempted to maintain self-contained, in order that wide wisdom of meta­ logical themes isn't assumed. In a notice, the ebook presupposes not more logical facility than is regularly occurring between operating philosophers and graduate scholars, even though it could demand unaccustomed energy in its application.

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It is a consequence of (i) above that the ratio T(a) - T(b) T(c) - T(d) is invariant for given objects a, b, c, and d, no matter which scale of temperature is used to measure it. It is a further important consequence that the average of two temperatures is also invariant in the following sense: If the temperature of the object a is midway between those of band c, that will be so no matter which scale is employed to measure temperature: T(a) = T(b) - T(c) 2 is either true for all scales, T, of temperature or true for none.

In the case of reductio proof, for example, we should say that in considering the premise no judgment is being made, or judgment is being suspended, and that no complete object is before the mind. In addition, however, to having a somewhat ad hoc character, the notion of object of the mind now assuming an important technical status, not yet explained, it has also the disadvantage that perhaps the most plausible of the inferential rules governing belief, which is initially supported by the mentalistic view, now must be abandoned.

The strength of such a belief will, he says, be mj k just when: (i) The lively conception (belief in A) is followed in the mind by the lively conceptions of some distinct C 1" .. , C k • (ii) Just m of these cases are seen to be B. Hume's account assumes the principle of indifference. The alternatives in which B obtains are supposed to contribute equally to the strength of the belief in B. It is quite clear that this account is intended to be probabilistic, that is to conform to the laws. (iii) If B is a necessary consequence of A, then the strength of belief in B given A is 1.